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Abstract  
This paper explores the trajectory of a novel evaluation device for customer 
satisfaction with service encounters and the performance of financial advisors. 
Drawing on literature on quantification and commensuration, boundary ob-
jects and bipartite collaboration, we explore the set-up and collaboration 
between employer and trade union in the design phase and the actual use and 
translation of the valuation system. The data stems from a multi-year, multi-
site study of banking in two Nordic countries. The analysis illustrates how, 
when some operational managers started using the device to suit their own 
purposes, the process morphed from an initial agreement into a dispute. The 
paper shows how quantitative systems of evaluation easily diverge from their 
initially proposed purposes when in use, producing reactivity and resistance 
among organizational members. Some financial advisors were positive about 
the evaluation device and the opportunity it afforded to improve performance, 
whereas others regarded it as another surveillance attempt for enhancing 
management control. We also contribute to the literature by elaborating on the 
relationship between reactivity and resistance on individual and collective 
levels. 
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Introduct ion 
The [evaluation] device represents a structured way of improving customer satis-
faction […]. How they [financial advisors] perform in encounters with customers 
is pivotal for the customers’ decision to buy something or search somewhere else. 
(Manager/Vice-President, 2010) 
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We emphasized that this is a tool for development and not for control and sur-
veillance. It went totally wrong in one region […] and it ended in full 
‘baluba’ [dispute]. (Shop steward, 2011) 
Systematic evaluation, the making of a judgement about the num-
ber, amount or value of some phenomena based upon quantification 
and measurement is becoming inherent in nearly all aspects of human 
activity, not least in the sphere of formal work life (Ball 2010). Increas-
ingly, as ‘selves’ quantified by such evaluation devices, we live in an 
audit society and culture characterized by the widespread rise of indic-
ators, standards and rankings (e.g. Roberts 1991; Power 1997; Sewell 
et al. 2011; Shore and Wright 2015a), characterized by panoptical 
devices and self-surveillance. Under conditions of the latter, evaluation 
shades into valuation: an estimation of one’s worth by one’s self reflex-
ively using evaluation devices for this purpose.  
New systems of performance measurement have been introduced to 
work places in a range of industries, often justified in positive ways by 
reference to the need to meet global competition, deal with market 
forces and increase performance and quality for the good of all parties 
involved. Since the 1980s, especially, front line workers in banking 
have experienced fundamental changes in job demands, summarized as 
a transition from being tellers to becoming competitive sellers (Regini 
et al. 1999; Forseth 2005; Bjørkeng and Clegg 2010; Forseth et al. 
2015). The specific dimensions and impacts of these changes have been 
addressed in our previous research such as ambivalences in frontline 
work (Forseth 2010) and comparing transformation of work in retail 
and banking (Forseth and Dahl-Jørgensen 2002). Novel monitoring 
and new key performance indicators (KPIs) have been introduced, 
along with the customer, into the employer–employee relation. The 
terms auditing, monitoring or mapping are often used to denote im-
partiality; however, the everyday acceptability of these terms obscures 
how the systems that sustain them construct categories central to 
power relations in organizations (Osborne and Rose 1999; MacKenzie 
2003; Law and Urry 2004; Larsen and Røyrvik 2017). A growing lit-
erature in the social sciences suggests that evaluation should be viewed 
in terms of processes that enact “how people, things and idea(l)s are 
ordered in relation to one another” (Kjellberg and Mallard 2013: 17), 
as the outcome of extensive institutional effort and social practices de-
voted to “rendering heterogeneous resources commensurable” (Styhre 
2013: 52).  
Our point of departure is the introduction of a novel evaluation 
device; a survey for measuring customer satisfaction with the service 
encounter between customers and financial advisors. The name of the 
valuation device is “Moment of Truth” or MOT. The term initially 
stemmed from bullfighting and was introduced into the service man-
agement literature in the 1980s (Normann 1984 [2001]) denoting the 
first contact or interaction between a customer and a service provider. 
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CEO Janne Carlzon, in his efforts to make the Scandinavian airlines 
more customer oriented, popularized the term (Carlzon 1985, 1988). 
Transferred to a service encounter the term is taken to represent a bin-
ary situation in which the salesperson is the responsible agent. Cus-
tomer satisfaction is signified by the decision to purchase and customer 
dissatisfaction by the salesperson’s failure to close a sale opportunity 
fortuitously for the merchant or service provider. In cases of satisfac-
tion managerial discourse can talk about “magic moments” and in case 
of dissatisfaction it refers to “moments of misery”. Binaries define real-
ity and make salespersons responsible for the decisions that customers 
make. In the financial industry where products are very similar, advert-
ising that firms excel in customer care and in creating “magic mo-
ments” for customers is an important element used to make one firm 
stand out from the others and is an essential tool in the competitive 
struggle (Forseth et al. 2015). Of course, as in other retail areas, the 
salesperson becomes the responsible agent such that management can 
hold them accountable for the ratio of moments of “magic” to 
“misery”.  
By looking at the trajectory of the use of the evaluation device in 
regard to front line sales in a Nordic bank, we ask a research question 
the answer to which contributes novel insights in at least three ways. 
The question is simple: Over time, how are evaluation devices’ func-
tion as boundary objects sustained, justified and resisted between em-
ployers and unions? First, we analyse the evaluation device in relation 
to a literature of social studies of quantification and commensuration 
(e.g. Power 1997; Espeland and Sauder 2007). Second, we contribute 
to the literature on bipartite collaboration between employers and 
unions. Industrial relations are portrayed in adversarial terms in 
Anglo-American contexts, unlike the Nordic setting where manage-
ment and labour are conceived of as having conflicting and common 
interests, as “counterparties and collabo-rators” (Bungum et al. 2015; 
Dølvik et al. 2014). Thus, in our case management enrolled the union 
to facilitate collaboration between the two parties. They did so by us-
ing the evaluation device as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 
1989; Star 2010; Lainer-Wos 2013). Nonetheless, the enrolment was 
not unproblematic as it created collaboration as well as resistance. 
Longitudinal data, drawn from a multi-year, multi-site study of bank-
ing in two Nordic countries from 2007–12 with a follow-up in 2017, 
enables us to follow the trajectory of the valuation device over time 
from consent to controversy and beyond. Third, we bring frontline 
sales and sales management into the realm of social studies of finance 
and evaluation in order to provide a more detailed discussion of fin-
ance as a social phenomenon separate from consideration of it as an 
economic object of “high finance”.  
In the following section we outline the theoretical resources we will 
deploy before we present the research design and methodology. We di-
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vide the data analysis into three phases: first, the set-up and introduct-
ory phase of the valuation system; second, the phases of its utilization, 
translation and becoming a site of emerging conflict; third, the resolu-
tion and transformative phase. We contribute to the literature by illus-
trating how espoused purposes marking the introduction of an evalu-
ation system can have unintended consequences when organizational 
actors start using the system for personal appraisal – for valuation of 
theirselves and others.  
Our results illustrate how the process of evaluation morphed from 
an initial agreement among the parties concerning its use to it be-com-
ing an object of controversy when some operational managers, who 
had not been part of the design negotiations, started using the device 
for their own purpose. We renewed contact with the field eight years 
after our first research encounter and include results from this en-
gagement. In the wake of a new turn to customer orientation the eval-
uation system has been transformed and there is more emphasis on the 
qualitative aspects. Finally, we discuss the contributions and the im-
plications of our research. 
Theoretical resources 
The first theoretical pillar we draw on is that of social studies of quan-
tification and commensuration, fact making, accountability and audit-
ing (e.g. Porter 1995; Poovey 1998; Merry et al. 2015). Building on the 
work of Power (1997), Espeland and Sauder (2007: 1) note that: “In 
the past two decades demands for accountability, transparency, and 
efficiency have prompted a flood of social measures designed to evalu-
ate the performances of individuals and organizations”. Their interest 
is in how various rankings have emerged and the effects these have, a 
process that they refer to as commensuration – the way that qualitative 
phenomena are quantified and measured to facilitate comparison. Es-
peland and Sauder assert that actors are reflexive – meaning they are 
self-aware and thoughtful about the situation they find themselves in – 
and try to perform well in rankings. They refer to this as reactivity: 
“Although definitions of reactivity vary across approaches, the basic 
idea is the same: individuals alter their behaviour in reaction to being 
evaluated, observed, or measured” (Espeland and Sauder 2007: 6). 
Commensuration and reactivity are a powerful mix: they constitute 
employees who are well aware that they are subjects of surveillance; 
that this surveillance will be expressed in quantitative ranking of their 
performance and, when they are aware of the ranking purposes, will 
alter their behaviour in consequence. A large literature in accounting 
illustrates the effects of performance measures on individuals and or-
ganizations (see for instance Roberts 1991 on accountability and the 
sense of self and Jeacle and Carter 2012 on accounting as a mediator 
between creativity and control). Metrics invented for purposes of 
seemingly objective evaluation can become used for something else, 
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such as reflexive personal auditing of performance as well as personnel 
evaluation (Armstrong 2002).  
In the Nordic model of working life, bipartite collaboration is a 
cornerstone regulated by law (Bungum et al. 2015; Dølvik et al. 2014). 
Indeed, collaboration between employer and union representatives can 
go beyond the basis regulated by law, such as strategic issues related to 
shutdowns and hiring of managers, particularly in major enterprises 
(Levin et al. 2012: 98–104). In our case, the employer and the trade 
union shared a history of “boxing and dancing” (Huzzard et al. 2004; 
Forseth and Torvatn 2015), of disagreement and cooperation. Man-
agement invited the union to be involved in discussion and comment-
ary on the proposed evaluation device. Doing so, they established that 
the literature on boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 1989) was per-
tinent for our case, given the role that the evaluation device assumed.  
The concept of boundary object was initially developed as a way of 
analysing how artefacts can facilitate collaboration in the absence of 
consensus within science and technology studies. Boundary objects fa-
cilitate the ways that actors from different social realms manage to co-
operate while maintaining different viewpoints, interests, values, beliefs 
and different interpretations of reality. Any such object has to have a 
certain interpretative flexibility (Star 2010). A boundary object might 
be any object that is part of multiple social worlds that is “plastic 
enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites” (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393). The concept of 
boundary objects has been adopted beyond the realm of the science 
and technology literature. In organization studies, for instance, it has 
been used to discuss artefacts and engineering prototypes, patients and 
patient records, project management tools, as well as software specific-
ations and spin-off organizations (Lindberg and Czarniawska 2006; 
Lainer-Vos 2013; Miele 2014).  
Lainer-Vos (2013: 518) cautions against the simplification of the 
concept of boundary objects referring merely to cooperation between 
groups, a tendency to employ the term boundary objects in an anec-
dotal manner: not all objects can be boundary objects. He urges re-
searchers to focus on the non-human object and the persons involved, 
the process itself and how the properties of the object may or may not 
foster cooperation. In addition, it is important to look at the broader 
context in which these objects are embedded, keeping in mind that 
boundary objects might not always be able to bridge gaps between dif-
ferent parties over time. Agreements can turn into disputes as processes 
evolve from situations of cooperation to occasions where the boundary 
object serves as a phenomenon through which discord between various 
groups is articulated (Miele 2014). For instance, Boltanski and 
Thevenot (1999) focus on those critical moments that occur when 
people coordinating their actions experience something going wrong. 
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In such cases, old stories, forgotten things and accomplished acts might 
return to haunt a previously unruffled process with new and contested 
ways of making sense. Responsibility is the key contested process in 
the case of such disputes: one needs to tease out the grounds on which 
“responsibility for errors is distributed and on which new agreement 
can be reached” (1999: 359). Since there can exist many modes of jus-
tification, disputes can be understood as disagreements either about 
“whether the accepted rule of justification has not been violated or 
about which mode of justification to apply at all” (359). By bringing 
the justification process centre stage, they highlight the legitimacy of 
the agreement, rather than forging an explanation solely styled in 
terms of contingency, deceit or force. In this way, they aspire to de-
scribe and discuss the actors’ sense of justice or injustice, through 
which people ground their stances on a notion of legitimate worth.  
Responsibility is the key issue in power relations, notes Lukes 
(2005). To be able to identify a process as an exercise of power the as-
sumption is that it was in the exerciser’s power to act differently: “an 
attribution of power is at the same time an attribution of (partial or 
total) responsibility for certain consequences” (Lukes 2005: 58). It is 
for this reason that the justification process is so central: where it is the 
case that actors act differently in regard to attributions of responsibil-
ity, resisting some while accepting others, power relations are clearly in 
play. As Juris and Sitrin (2016) note, the emphasis in the literature has 
been on individualized, unorganized and defensive forms of resistance 
as a power relation. The anthropologist James Scott’s writings on the 
“prosaic but constant struggle between subordinates and their over-
seers” (Courpasson and Vallas 2016: 3) has been particularly format-
ive in its emphasis on “infrapolitics”, the “wide variety of low-profile 
forms of resistance” (Scott 1990: 19), which we also find in our case. 
To sum up, we draw on several theoretical pillars and concepts to 
shed light on the reactions to and impacts of the trajectory of the novel 
evaluation device as well as providing insight into job demands in 
front line sales in banking and contributing to the conceptual devel-
opment of the relationship between reactivity and resistance to evalu-
ation devices.  
Our case study affords insight into a significant research question 
concerning the infrapolitics of organization and how, over time, evalu-
ation devices function as boundary objects sustaining, justifying and 
resisting the relations they inscribe between employers and unions. 
These infrapolitics are irredeemably processual rather than structural. 
Traditionally employers and unionists are antagonists in industrial re-
lations arenas, but in a Nordic context also conceived of as collabor-
ators, and their relations of power are not fixed: they may be more or 
less concordant or dissonant and diverse devices can facilitate or 
hinder this concordance or dissonance.  
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In the next section, we will outline the context, research design and 
methodology. 
Context and methodology 
During the global financial crisis of 2007–08, the first author managed 
a research project on sales strategies and practices in finance. The tur-
moil that the crisis unleashed in the financial services sector brought 
some aspects related to sales to the fore; nonetheless, several negoti-
ations initiated on our part proposing research collaboration came to 
an abrupt halt. To gain access proved very difficult in the changed cli-
mate of post-crisis financial services. After several presentations to fin-
ancial business circles to establish academic relevance and legitimacy, 
we were able to rely on network contacts among bankers and shop 
stewards from previous research in finance to enrol bankers from six 
Nordic banks into a research project. For this paper, we draw on data 
from one Nordic bank that offers a full range of financial services in 
several European countries. The extent of its activities as well as their 
range made it particularly vulnerable to the crisis, such that it suffered 
significant economic losses compared with many other Nordic banks. 
The case is exemplary because of the severe impact of the crisis on this 
bank, making some post-crisis processes more evident.  
There had been many complaints about the bank having an “intro-
vert culture” and an organizational situation of declining customer sat-
isfaction and loss of customers, all before the financial crisis unfolded. 
The crisis aggravated the situation and contributed to a further de-
crease in customer trust, tarnishing the image of the bank as well as 
reducing returns for shareholders. The overall customer satisfaction 
with the bank marginally improved over 2009–10 but was still consid-
erably lower than it had been before the global financial crisis. Partly 
in response to the crisis an important issue was formulated in the in-
dustry as “right selling” (matching sales products to customer re-
quirements, income and investment profile) in contrast to what had 
become known as mis-selling (selling inappropriate products for the 
customer) (cf. Brannan 2017) and overselling (selling more product 
than the customer could afford), which generated a lack of customer 
trust (Forseth et al. 2015).  
In an attempt to increase customer satisfaction and pursue the aim 
of becoming more customer-centric, management had initiated a pro-
ject to develop a new evaluation system directed towards frontline op-
erations and the performance of financial advisors, those responsible 
for sales work. Additionally, its baseline data was meant to serve as a 
point of departure for improving individual performance among the 
advisors. Management enrolled the presidency of the trade union in 
the project, with the union becoming a representative spokesperson for 
the evaluation device. The performance measure, which was geared 
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towards a non-financial dimension of performance and a longer-term 
goal (customer service and customer satisfaction), introduced 
threshold values that became forward-looking performance targets.  
We interviewed a wide range of participants as Table 1 denotes. A 
detailed description of our interaction with the field and the different 
types of empirical material in the larger study are presented in a table 
in the Appendix. The data for this paper mostly stems from document 
and website analyses and interviews conducted in two countries with a 
strategic sample of people covering different levels and positions in a 
Nordic bank. The research approach adopted was interpretative and 
qualitative in its research methodology. 
Table 1. Position, numbers and identification of interviewees. 
Before the interviews, we went through available documents and web-
sites to learn more about the history, organizational self-presentation, 
key facts and figures as well as the espoused core values and strategies 
of the focal banks. These were important inputs when creating open-
ended interview guides for different categories of personnel. After col-
lecting documentary material, we conducted face-to-face interviews 
with managers at different levels, financial advisors, shop stewards and 
union representatives. We strove to maintain an open dialogue during 
the interviews and sought to understand how it was possible for these 
informants to be able to reason as they did. The interviews lasted from 
45 minutes to 2 hours.  
From the outset interviewees talked to us about the evaluation 
device (called MOT) in both positive and negative terms. Its novelty 
was that it used customer evaluations of staff, making the staff politic-
ally responsible for how they were judged. Intrigued, at the end of 
2011, we were able to familiarize ourselves with an article written by a 
journalist in the trade union magazine on the topic of this evaluation 
device. In this four-page article, a bank manager (vice-president) and 
the vice-president of the professional trade union expressed their views 
Position of interviewees Numbers Identification
Manager strategic level (M_S) 4 #1- #4
Manager operative level (M_O) 2 #1- #2
Senior financial advisor 4 #1- #4
Financial advisor 1 #1
Financial advisor/union representative (local 
level)
4 #1- #4
Shop steward (presidency of union) 3 #1- #3
Customer service representative 1 #1
Manager strategic level (M_S), follow-up 2017 1 #5
Total 20
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and discussed the purpose, practice and consequences of the new eval-
uation system. On two occasions, during interviews with a manager 
and a senior financial advisor, we were shown the MOT score reports 
on their data screens. We took notes about the particular items on dis-
play and recorded how they interpreted the results and the nature of 
their comments about the pros and cons of the MOT device. Later, we 
received a printed copy of the questionnaire distributed to the custom-
ers. Re-entering the field some years later we sent emails to three 
former interviewees, to which they replied detailing current monitoring 
of performance and customer interaction. Finally, we accessed the re-
vised survey via email and undertook an additional interview with a 
middle manager who elaborated on the new customer-centric strategies 
and the subsequent revision of customer mapping and evaluation 
devices. During the research process, we moved between theoretical 
frameworks, empirical data and interpretations (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). The process of data analysis and interpretation pro-
ceeded through several iterative steps (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011). 
We first read through the transcripts from the interviews and relevant 
documentary material several times. In the next step, we selected im-
portant quotes representing the different functions. We coded the 
quotes and put them in a table for comparison. The themes identified 
were recurrent in the material and were resonant with interviews that 
we conducted, serving as a description of the system, purpose, use and 
consequences (intended and unintended) of the evaluation system. We 
then consulted literature on the relevant topics and re-read the tran-
scripts, looking for more details and nuances in interpretation as well 
as relevant interview quotes. After the initial review process, we ex-
panded the scope of the article and reread the transcripts from the in-
terviews. A selection of quotes is presented verbatim to make the 
storytelling of the actors come alive through raw data that we sub-
sequently analyse and discuss. 
Assessing service encounters in banking 
Phase one: developing the device 
Management emphasized that it was essential that financial advisors 
were “willing to go the extra mile for customers” in order to enhance 
customer satisfaction. The innovation termed MOT was regarded as 
an important tool aiding such development as well as a step towards 
increasing competitive edge and market share. A unique feature of this 
particular case was that the unions were involved from an early stage. 
Indeed, our story began when the first author was contacted by a shop 
steward inquiring about her research on service encounters in finance 
(Forseth 2001, 2005) because their financial institution had hired a 
consultancy firm and was planning to set up an evaluation device 
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named MOT for mapping customer satisfaction with the service en-
counter, a measure developed in addition to their global measure of 
customer satisfaction. A manager elaborated on the collaboration with 
the union: 
There is one particular aspect I would like to add, and that is that I have been 
explicitly enrolling the trade union. So, when we decided to go from team level to 
individual level, I set up a project where we invited the union. They were actually 
allowed to define, very, very much of our new customer survey. (Manager_S #2, 
2010) 
Shop stewards confirmed that they were enrolled at an early phase, 
collaborating constructively with the employer: “We were involved 
from the start and could provide input and thoughts” (Shop steward 
#1, 2011). The trade union, however, emphasized that it was not 
“their” project from the start so much as one driven by management, 
with the union’s primary motive being to focus on the principles bey-
ond the evaluation device.  
Our point of departure has been to safeguard in the best possible way that this is 
a development tool, and that it is not the only thing that is being done to attain 
more customers. (Union vice-president, trade union magazine: 7)  
The trade union also proposed that while all financial advisors could 
not reach the top scores, the scores could nevertheless serve as a stimu-
lus for improving personal performance. Indeed, it is worth noting the 
emotional terms in which they talked about the valuation device: “As 
long as it [the device] functions as a caring push” (union vice-presid-
ent, trade union magazine: 7). The term “caring push” is here used to 
denote a positive aspect of the evaluation tool (cf. Sewell and Barker 
2006), which was a prerequisite for the trade union’s support for the 
new system. In their opinion, the most important aspect of the baseline 
data produced by the device was to help low performers to develop 
and discover those areas of the counselling (sales) process that they 
needed to improve. The device took on a “human” caring dimension 
by virtue of this emotional expression. Although each individual sales-
person would be responsible for what they achieved as measured by 
the device the implicit agreement was that they would not be held re-
sponsible and be punished for low scores but be assisted to improve. 
Management stressed that the new evaluation tool had several positive 
advantages: it would serve as a stimulus and guidance for the indi-
vidual financial advisor, afford systematic follow-up (coaching by op-
erational sales managers and a tool kit) and be a benchmark for teams. 
It’s not the measurements themselves which are good, but the knowledge that the 
measurements gives, which provides an opportunity to discuss what an advisor 
does well and what to do better. MOT is more objective than two peoples’ sub-
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jective opinions, because it is the customer’s honest opinion we get. (Manager/
vice-president, trade union magazine: 6) 
The quote illustrates several aspects of managerial discourse. Data 
from the monitoring of performance is presented as being more “ob-
jective” than the “subjective” views of a manager (or the individual 
financial advisor) because it is based on the “customer’s honest opin-
ion”: it is assumed that the customers do not express subjective views, 
something actually backed up by the vice-president of the trade union: 
“It is a more objective tool compared to what a single manager can do 
making studies within his own brain” (trade union magazine: 7). 
Neither union nor management problematize opinion from an uncon-
trollable entity, the customers, at this point. Instead they seem to take 
the results and the measures from this survey at face value. Doing so 
reflects a belief that has become ubiquitous under neoliberalism, that 
“the market” is objective and “always right” (Røyrvik 2018). Although 
the knowledge generated by the customers has a different position in 
relation to the employer–employee dyad, as a third-party view, it is 
definitely not “objective”.  
There was an initial agreement, after the crisis, regarding the need 
to improve customer orientation and customer satisfaction with the 
service encounter shared by the union and management. They agreed 
that the MOT device could be one measure for achieving that goal. 
The two parties, however, underscored different aspects of the value of 
this performance evaluation device in their accounts.  
We did not get a single complaint – or rather, the union did not get a single com-
plaint. That is worth noting. It has to do with the way one can break the preju-
dices one can have about each other, and then work unbelievably constructively 
together. I think that I have a super collaboration with the vice-president and his 
people [in the union], and I also think that they experience that we are very re-
sponsive towards them. But from time to time we disagree, and then we discuss it 
and so on. (Manager_S, #2, 2010) 
In the quote, he talks about “we” in the implementation process but 
later spells out that it was the union that did not get a single com-
plaint. He also seems to attribute the lack of resistance partly to the 
process of bipartite collaboration, in which the two parties had shared 
their viewpoints and discussed details regarding the implementation 
and use of the new valuation device, reaching agreement. The manager 
told us that in the past there had been strong adversarial relations 
between the social partners, even conflicts. This project, he continued, 
had demonstrated that adversarial relationships did not have to be the 
norm, that one can share visions and viewpoints and come to an 
agreement if one establishes a respectful dialogue early. As such it was 
an example of “dancing” (Huzzard et al. 2004) together for enhanced 
customer orientation and improved performance, notwithstanding that 
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the parties could at times have different definitions of the situation (cf. 
Rosness and Forseth 2014). Thus, in the first phase the union became a 
representative spokesperson for the performance device. Two years 
later, a shop steward told us that systems for performance measure-
ments were actually one of their main areas of concern. We will sub-
sequently present data from union members and financial advisors ex-
pressing more nuanced views and critical comments regarding the use 
and translation of the evaluation device.  
Phase two: using the device 
The protocol for using the evaluation device was that after a service 
encounter with a financial advisor, every fifth customer would receive 
an email and be asked to answer a questionnaire about the counselling 
and the service they received, using a scale from one to ten for each 
parameter. The questions covered the following topics: first impres-
sions (including physical premises); preparation and performance of 
the advisor; were they satisfied with the service encounter? did they 
gain more than they expected from the encounter? would they recom-
mend this bank to friends and relatives based on this particular en-
counter? These questions were intended to tap into those dimensions 
of behaviour that were controlled by the financial advisors. Around 
twenty items in the survey dealt with the advisor. 
At first the average scores were aggregated and presented only at the 
team level but from 2010 onwards summary reports were distributed 
to each individual financial advisor every sixth month. These reports 
were identical with MOT but quite symbolically were called “I-MOT”, 
literally referring to “Individual MOT” . These electronic reports gave 1
the individual advisor feedback on performance and served as input 
for a conversation with their operational sales manager about the res-
ults.  
We discuss the experiences of the customers, why they have experienced this, and 
what we can do in order to ensure that they get even better experiences. (Man-
ager_vice-president, trade union magazine: 6) 
In order to improve performance, individual advisors would have to 
move out of the “comfort zone”. During the conversation with their 
operational manager they would together formulate an action plan for 
what the advisor could do “significantly differently”. Management, 
however, underscored that this was only one element in a bigger plan 
for developing employees, enhancing customer orientation and intro-
ducing a programme for sales training. The baseline data was meant to 
serve as a good point of departure for improving individual perform-
 In Scandinavian languages (“imot” “imod” “emot”) can mean both “towards” or 1
“against”, an indexical meaning in terms of the use to which these electronic reports 
would be put.
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ance, but the results were also aggregated on a team level to enable 
comparison between teams, branches and brands.  
In the following we will elaborate and discuss different reactions to 
this mapping as well as what different stakeholders summarized as the 
strong and weak points of the new evaluation device. The reactions to 
the new device were threefold; some welcomed it and were glad to 
learn how their customers rated them. One senior financial advisor 
(#3) was among those who welcomed the device, saying he was very 
happy about receiving individual feedback – “many of us like to be 
seen”, he added. He was among the top ten performers and usually 
had high scores on all parameters listed above, except for the selling of 
complex financial products. He added that experienced financial ad-
visors tried to comfort newcomers who were nervously occupied with 
their presentation of self after poor scores on the I-MOT. By comfort-
ing their colleagues, they tried to counteract the negative impact. Other 
financial advisors regarded the MOT device as just an add-on to the 
other performance indicators, although they raised the question of 
why they as professionals had to be monitored on all aspects of their 
job. The third group of financial advisors and several union represent-
atives were critical, and they complained that the MOT measure added 
to the enhanced sales pressure and the strain of the job.  
It is yet another key performance indicator which contributes to more stress. The 
problem is that there is always something new – and it has to be measured, and 
there are no reductions in the number of previous measures. [---] I am completely 
disciplined, and if I get a poor I-MOT[result], I have to work hard. (Financial ad-
visor/union representative #6, 2011)  
He further commented that he thought most of the financial advisors 
would have liked to dismiss the MOT device (yet some advisors had 
opposing views and used the term “exciting” about the device). Be-
sides, he underscored that it was very negative if operational managers 
did not make their own decisions but relied too heavily on these per-
formance mappings. In his opinion, there was a general pattern that 
younger financial advisors accepted new evaluation devices more easily 
because they were used to them and enjoyed receiving feedback, 
whereas some of the more senior financial advisors disliked such feed-
back, something that touches on a wider discussion about monitoring 
and its impacts. A shop steward (#2, 2011) talked about what he saw 
as double communication within the financial industry in general: 
“competent professionals are told that they are free to perform but in 
reality they are controlled from A to Z.” He added that he was sur-
prised that there was not more resistance towards this kind of control 
and surveillance. One manager (Manager #2, 2010) said that employ-
ees in banking had been “subject to 15 years of torture”, for which he 
used the term “KPI-bulimia” to denote the large number of KPIs in 
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use. Personally, he would have liked to reduce the numbers, but he was 
in favour of the MOT evaluation device. At an in-house workshop run 
by the financial union several employees talked about the increase in 
monitoring, referring to it as “kindergarten” mentality. They experi-
enced such monitoring as infantile and as an insult to their profession-
al identity. 
In an answer to our question on what the union regarded as the 
strong and weak points of the MOT device, we received the following 
response: 
The strongest part is to visualize if we are good at customer orientation. It is also 
a tool for development and improvement. There are tool kits for every part, and 
different measures such as coaching. The negative part is if MOT becomes related 
to pay, and there is a display of results without a focus on improvements. 
Someone might also take the opportunity of manipulating with MOT; it is very 
simple to manipulate. (Shop steward #1, 2011) 
Not only this shop steward but also several other financial advisors 
emphasized that I-MOT should be a tool for the individual financial 
advisor and the operational manager, summarizing the positive aspects 
from their point of view, albeit that the union was also concerned 
about possible downsides of the mapping if it was related to pay and 
employment relations. When we asked financial advisors how one 
could manipulate the evaluation device, one of them gave us an ex-
ample while showing us his I-MOT score report:  
By not closing the case [making a registration] from a service encounter with a 
negative outcome, such as when customers are denied a loan. Such encounters are 
likely to get negative scores from the customers. I closed a meeting and told the 
customers: “Sorry, but you cannot realize your dream about buying a shop and 
starting a business.” Of course, they will not give you good scores. (Senior finan-
cial advisor #3, 2011) 
He went on to tell us that he had heard that other colleagues who did 
not provide the customer with what they wanted, did not register such 
encounters to avoid receiving a negative outcome. “Because if two out 
of twenty give you bottom scores, you get a very poor result”, he ad-
ded. One of his customers had also commented on the framing of the 
survey questions and written a letter to the advisor’s superior. The cus-
tomer had objected to the question as to whether or not she gained 
more than expected out of the encounter with her financial advisor. 
She wrote that she always got what she expected and that she did not 
expect any more. But if she answered that she got what she expected, it 
would be interpreted as a negative result. He also said that his col-
leagues on site received low scores on the question about first impres-
sions, with one common explanation for this being that customers 
were counselled in tiny cell offices without windows. There was one 
exception, which might have to do with how she greeted her custom-
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ers, the colleagues reflected. Customers could experience service en-
counters differently even if the physical space was the same. Using the 
evaluation device at group levels made sense for identifying shortcom-
ings with the service encounter but made less or no sense for assessing 
the individual performance of advisors. Seemingly, none of our in-
formants questioned either the specific name of the evaluation device 
or the “truth” aspect in its title. One explanation might be that they 
were familiar with the term MOT from the service management liter-
ature, or that they just regarded it as a name with a fancy acronym. 
Neither of the representatives involved in establishing the device, from 
either the employer or the union side, questioned the legitimacy of a 
performance measure called the MOT being rated by a third party. In 
situ it was perceived as a different assessment from one that would ob-
tain from the subjective views of a manager – as if customers did not 
offer subjective views.  
Management underscored that customer satisfaction was pivotal for 
improving the competitive edge, that the MOT valuation device was 
an attempt to have a way of mapping performance in this regard as 
well as a structured way of following up the results. When asked about 
the validity of the MOT valuation tool, a manager answered the fol-
lowing: 
I am not so concerned about people interpreting the questions differently as long 
as you have enough observations. [---] If one should be critical, there are two oth-
er questions: First, do the customers answer in an honest way? They don´t; cus-
tomers always answer by saying they are more satisfied than they really are. Be-
cause we find it a little difficult, at least in this country, to say something negative 
about each other. Then there is the other point: On has to be careful and not 
make Moment of Truth into a global measure for customer satisfaction. (Man-
ager_S #2, 2010) 
The above quote discusses some aspects of the validity of the measure 
and identifies some ambivalence on part of the employer. Previously, 
management underscored the objectivity of this measure because it 
was a judgement made by customers as a third party. The manager was 
not concerned about customers’ interpretation of the questions, rather 
that customers tended to give higher scores in terms of their satisfac-
tion because they liked to be nice and not criticize their advisor too 
harshly. This contradicts former claims by management and the union 
about customers not being biased but expressing their “honest views”, 
as illustrated in previous quotes. He also points to the fact that the 
device is only one way of tapping customer satisfaction with services in 
the bank. Next, we will look into what happened during and after the 
occurrence of a critical incident.  
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Phase three: performing the MOT  
The union started receiving complaints from their members about the 
use of the evaluation device in 2011, after which the union and its 
members began to assume a more critical position towards the device, 
increasingly seeing it as a tool for surveillance and control. Some oper-
ational managers had started employing the evaluation device to satis-
fy their specific need for monitoring performance and ranking indi-
viduals. In one region of the company, we were told, some managers 
had ranked their sales personnel, the financial advisors, in categories 
related to performance and put it on public display within the organiz-
ation. “Results have been posted on the board so that everyone can see 
it. It does not matter so much but it is a new turn of control and dis-
cipline” (financial advisor/union representative #3, 2011). A financial 
advisor/union representative (#4, 2011) added that “it was not official 
that it had an effect on wages, but we know it does”. More critical 
views emerged as illustrated in this quote: “When we experience that 
some managers can use objectives such as total of 8.5 scores [on the 
mapping] to ‘strike people in their heads’, there is something wrong 
going on.” (Union vice-president, trade union magazine: 6). Clearly, the 
capacity to close a given volume of sales depends not just on the sales-
persons powers of selling but the customers disposable income, some-
thing highly variable between different branches. The MOT device, in 
becoming an individual stratifying practice, diverged from the initial 
purposes that management and the trade union representatives had 
agreed upon. Indeed, both the union and management had lost control 
over how the measure was used in some parts of the focal organiza-
tion. 
Shop stewards disliked how employees were being construed as de-
viants because they failed to reach the aim of 8.5 formulated by man-
agement or to hit the top scale. Trade union members complained that 
the valuation device was expanding in importance and becoming all-
embracing, encompassing aspects that had not previously been men-
tioned. The trade union coined the term “failure percent” to illustrate a 
worst-case scenario. They felt it was completely wrong for employ-
ment relations to be influenced because one failed to reach the goal, 
receiving 8 instead of 8.5 on the scale. Members also reported feeling 
threatened when I-MOT was used in relation to rewards systems and 
employment relations. Besides, trade union members claimed that op-
erational managers were also using the device as a tool for dismissal. 
Some union representatives even talked about “management by fear” 
among employees, as it was thought that managers would start using 
the rankings to eliminate low performers in upcoming processes of lay-
offs caused by a round of “redundancies”. Using the metrics in this 
way was a dramatic shift from the expressed intentions in the design 
negotiations, not at all what the union had agreed to in the initial dis-
cussions. Union members also started blaming the union for its collab-
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oration, accusing it of “only playing on the keyboard of the bank and 
being indifferent to members of the union”. Negative voices and res-
istance that had earlier been silent and/or silenced came to the fore, 
with the union becoming cast as advocates of increased surveillance by 
management. The union initially had been enrolled by management in 
an area (performance measurements) of management concern and 
through its support helped shape a frame for thinking about the evalu-
ation system within the organization that was initially hegemonic in its 
translation of employee interests to the device. Eventually, however, the 
union assumed a more critical position and underscored the control 
aspect of the measure that they had supported their members using. 
Having initially interpreted the device in positive terms, and acqui-
esced in the development on these terms, they now came to translate 
what the device did as something antagonistic to its members’ in-
terests. 
One shop steward (#1, 2011) said that while bipartite cooperation 
with management was important it was sometimes double-edged, 
presenting challenges. He had played an active part in the initial phase 
and maintained that even if the union made some critical points, they 
became co-producers with management. He elaborated on what often 
happens in translation processes after the initial agreement on imple-
mentation and use. 
We are presented with one “canvas” that we discuss. Then we get a different 
“canvas” from the [operational] managers. The pictures and thoughts do not 
come forward in a consistent way – there are several messages – and Human Re-
source partners in various regions interpret the message in different ways and the 
practice becomes different. There is a lack of follow-up that ensures that everyone 
gets the same understanding, the same practice and the same follow-up. There are 
too many images to keep track of. When the original “canvas” is presented the 
motive as well as the frame have to be included. (Shop steward #1, 2011)  
The metaphor of a canvas is used in order to exemplify the translation 
process that occurred and how different stakeholders interpreted and 
used this process differently, especially those who had not participated 
in the initial discussions. In this case, a new metric invented for one 
purpose, as a development tool for more customer orientation, became 
translated into something completely different – a performance meas-
urement for control and discipline purposes. In this case the initial 
agreement morphed into a disagreement regarding the use of the valu-
ation tool by some operational managers. In order to discuss the use 
and manipulation of the device and solve the controversy a meeting 
was arranged between the employer’s human resources department 
and the union. The outcome was a document spelling out “facts or fic-
tions” about the MOT device, what had been agreed (the initial inten-
tions) and disagreed. Regarding the future use of the device, a shop 
steward (#1) made a prophecy that it would fade away after a period 
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of time if increased returns did not flow to the bank as a result of its 
deployment. 
Discussion  
In the wake of deregulation in the industry since the 1980s, the intro-
duction of new technologies and a range of new financial products and 
services, employees in banking have become subject to additional KPIs 
and novel devices for monitoring performance. We have shed light on 
the trajectory of a novel evaluation device for customer satisfaction 
with service encounters and the performance of financial advisors; its 
use and translation, the reactions and impacts.  
Acts of quantification and commensuration – turning qualitative 
phenomena into quantities for making comparisons – underpin con-
temporary work life. We are accustomed to hearing about the per-
formance of individuals and organizations being expressed in numbers. 
Espeland and Sauder (2007) identified three characteristics of com-
mensuration that produce reactivity. They are “its capacity to reduce, 
simplify, and integrate information; the new, precise, and all-encom-
passing relationships it creates”, and “its capacity to elicit reflection on 
the validity of quantitative evaluation” (Espeland and Sauder 2007: 
16). The first point is that commensuration reduces large amounts of 
data to a single number in a ranking table: “Numbers circulate more 
easily and are more easily remembered than more complicated forms 
of information” (2007: 18). The second point identifies that commen-
suration builds a common relationship between separate individuals by 
comparing them using the same metric. Simultaneously, the metric dif-
ferentiates between different people – it creates a set of relations 
between them in terms of their distribution on the metric’s scores. The 
third point concerns what the numbers produced in the act of com-
mensuration actually mean. Espeland and Sauder (2007) illustrate that 
the producers of rankings see what they produce as a “real” account of 
relations between different individuals that tend to be accepted be-
cause of the legitimation that metrics afford.  
Leonardi’s (2011) study of computer simulation popularized the no-
tion of a boundary object (such as an information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) system) as affording certain possible actions. 
The evaluation device, as a means of producing a metric, provided cer-
tain affordances, most notably that employee ratings construct a social 
reality that is then taken to represent the reality of the organization. 
Such an affordance is not an objective property of the device being 
used so much as of that which, in a second order manner, the device 
makes possible. What the device makes possible is a means of formu-
lating and doing differentiation in performance. Such quantitative 
measures and rankings do not simply register phenomena already ex-
isting in social reality or represent them in a neutral way. On the con-
trary, such systems are generative and performative technologies that 
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co-construct and help shape the phenomena they are meant to “re-
cord” (Osborne and Rose 1999; MacKenzie 2003; Law and Urry 
2004; Larsen and Røyrvik 2017), something explicitly addressed in 
contemporary marketing and management research (Poon 2007; Azi-
mont and Araujo 2010; Mason et al. 2015). Furthermore, such systems 
not only alter behaviour but also give rise to new subjectivities and 
forms of thinking that come fused with normative premises that facil-
itate regimes of (self-)control and systems of discipline (Shore and 
Wright 2015b). Reactivity is thus part of a cultural transformation, in 
this case within the organization, spurred by these measurements.  
In our focal organization we identified very different patterns of re-
activity and resistance to being evaluated; a wide range of low-profile 
forms of resistance (infrapolitics), as well as positive reactions, were 
observed among interviewees and their colleagues. The high per-
formers rejoiced and expressed satisfaction at the possibility of keeping 
track of their sales figures and being/becoming visible. At the other end 
of the scale, the critics blamed the “system” and complained about in-
creased sales pressure, stress and strain and enhanced surveillance. In 
between these categories, some employees tried to do their best and 
distance themselves from the performance monitoring, sales pressure 
and fierce competition.  We identified interesting patterns relating to 2
reactivity and resistance illustrative of how the two concepts are pat-
terned. Regarding reactivity, financial advisors expressed very different 
opinions towards the MOT device. Voicing criticism, however, did not 
necessarily lead to taking action. One senior financial advisor de-
scribed himself as a resister refusing to sell complex financial products 
(one important KPI at that time). He underscored the ethics of fully 
understanding the products he offered to his customers. Others could 
be categorized as “passive resisters” because they had decided to do 
their best at sales without becoming obsessed with the MOT figures. 
Some, in the pursuit of top scores, manipulated the system by not re-
gistering customer encounters with negative outcomes on the part of 
the customer. The practice illustrated variance in individual actions but 
individual complaints to the union also spurred on what we identified 
as collective action. Indeed, a dispute arose between management and 
the trade union after a critical incident when some managers started 
using individual results from the evaluation device to suit their own 
purpose. Harsh criticism was made of management, but union mem-
bers also blamed the trade union for teaming up with management in-
stead of taking a critical position. Finally the union took on a more 
critical stance towards the evaluation device due to its translation and 
 These categorical distinctions fit well with a typology of sellers identified in a previ2 -
ous case study in insurance; “super seller”, “service seller” and “system seller” (for 
further details see Berge et al. 2009).
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use for surveillance in contrast to the development tool to which they 
had agreed.  
The MOT rating system was a device that, in making individual ad-
visors commensurably and publicly responsible for securing sales, ex-
ercised discriminatory power within the bank. The ratings led, wit-
tingly or otherwise, to a fundamental reshaping of how financial ad-
visors were encouraged to see themselves and how others saw them. 
The critical juncture happened when the I-MOT system  partially 3
transformed from a development tool for learning how to be more cus-
tomer oriented to an individual accountability device geared towards 
surveillance, ranking and disciplining performance. For managers used 
to a culture of spreadsheets and comparisons, this was just another 
tool for ranking employees, one that they could use to produce num-
bers without necessarily reflecting on the consequences of doing so.  
Publicly ranking individual’s measures triggered employee resistance 
and the trade union shifted its position from being a spokesperson for 
the system to becoming critical. Reactivity partially changed to resist-
ance. Such quantitative measures and rankings did not simply register 
phenomena already existing in social reality or represent them in a 
neutral way. On the contrary, such systems were generative and per-
formative technologies that co-constructed and helped shape the phe-
nomena they were meant to “record” (Larsen and Røyrvik 2017). Fur-
thermore, such systems not only altered behaviour but also gave rise to 
new subjectivities and forms of thinking that fused with normative 
premises facilitating regimes of (self-)control and systems of discipline 
(ibid; Shore and Wright 2015b). Reactivity is thus part of a cultural 
transformation, in this case within the organization, spurred on by 
these measurements. 
In a postscript to the research, some eight years after our first visit, 
we followed up on the research to see what use of the device was being 
made. We sent emails to some of our informants asking about the cur-
rent state of play in terms of the use of the MOT device. According to 
an email response from the union “it used to be a big issue among the 
members”, but the bank did not use this device anymore, and we were 
advised to contact the Human Resources department for further ex-
planation. Besides, they wrote, “Mystery Shoppers were the thing”, 
and in addition, the bank had hired a consultancy to investigate its 
customer base. A financial advisor replied that they still used an evalu-
ation device but in a different form, which he later forwarded after 
 Interestingly, the acronym MOT has a double meaning when read as a word in 3
Scandinavian languages. It can denote both “courage” and “against”. With the turn 
to I-MOT, the individualized accountability and discipline-oriented version of the 
system, the acronym read as a word shifted meaning from “courage”, while its de-
notation as “being against” strengthened. This shift in meaning signified the simul-
taneous turn to an attitude of resistance against the system in the organization on the 
part of the union.
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checking with his superiors. This email survey about a specific service 
encounter is distributed to a representative sample of the customers 
except those customers who have just received the global customer sat-
isfaction survey. The name MOT had disappeared, and at first glance 
the new opinion monitoring was a simplified version with only three 
questions to provide learning for the individual advisor. Core questions 
in the new device were recommendation of the bank to friends and re-
latives, and satisfaction with the counselling encounter, including the 
possibility for a qualitative comment. The final question had to do 
with what the “advisor did particularly well” (seven different options 
with ‘nothing’ as a final category) and what s/he could have done bet-
ter (the same seven categories). We were told that the qualitative com-
ment and the customers’ stories constituted the most important part of 
the responses.  
Questions outside the control of the individual advisor, such as first 
impressions (physical premises), had apparently been removed. Man-
agement seemingly had been through a process of learning by doing 
and realized that in order to enhance customer satisfaction the bank 
had to change the strategy and shift focus from sales to the customer’s 
point of view. Besides, by listening to customers, the financial advisors 
and the union they had learned that some questions in the MOT 
device were difficult to interpret and answer. When advisors started 
telling customers about the importance of the mapping and how they 
should interpret and answer some of the questions (e. g. “did you get 
more than expected”) there was a problem of validity.  
Sales targets for individual advisors had been abolished and they no 
longer received average sales scores. Instead management mapped cus-
tomer satisfaction and customer development (retention of customers 
and influx of new customers). In addition, they monitored how the dif-
ferent branches were performing in economic terms. We were told that 
the officers were relieved but also somewhat frustrated as they no 
longer received computed average scores. Managers, used to a culture 
of spreadsheets and comparisons, also felt uneasy when they could not 
rely on individual sales figures but were told to keep track of more 
long-term customer relations. By shifting focus, and doing less sales 
monitoring, customer satisfaction had initially increased but then de-
creased after the introduction of more graduated fees and charges de-
pending on the bank account and the number of services the customer 
was using.  4
 After media coverage of the “Panama papers” in 2016 and the extent of money 4
laundering and tax evasion afforded by tropical tax havens, customer satisfaction 
decreased somewhat. It is not only the “moments” of the service encounter that are 
important: global issues also have a significant impact on the reputation of individual 
banks and other financial institutions. 
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Management listened to the criticisms that developed but a decisive 
point came when customers also voiced critical comments about the 
content of the MOT device. Management realized that they had to 
think twice about their assumption that this was a strategic tool for 
mapping customer satisfaction. In order to bring customers and their 
perspectives centre stage, management decided to monitor different 
things: customer satisfaction and customer development; retention and 
influx of new customers; dropping individual sales targets for the fin-
ancial advisors. In so doing they redefined the power of advisors: they 
were no longer comparatively and differentially more or less respons-
ible in terms of procuring more sales. After some adjustments a modi-
fied and simplified evaluation system continued its organizational ex-
istence but with emphasis on qualitative comments and customers’ 
stories. 
Analysing the evaluation device as a boundary object, a pattern 
emerges. Initially the device successfully enacted and in a sense “nego-
tiated” a constructive collaboration for organizational development 
between the work-life partners – management and the trade union. Be-
ing involved in construing the purpose and design of the system, the 
trade union was enrolled as a developmental agent. The project of 
shaping the device organized consent and enacted a “dance” between 
the partners. However, when aspects of surveillance, ranking and con-
trol of the evaluation device I-MOT were accentuated, rather than be-
ing a boundary object that facilitated a dance of collaboration between 
partners the device became the occasion for staging a “boxing” match 
between them (Rosness and Forseth 2014). The evaluation system 
seemed not so much to provide a connecting bridge between ad-
versarial opponents but rather became an occasion for articulating dis-
cord (Miele 2014).  
The evaluation system continued its existence in a modified version 
such that, even after the main disagreements were seemingly resolved, 
the technology did not lose all of its boundary object qualities. Indeed, 
in spite of the strong resistance and criticism heaped upon manage-
ment because of the use made of the measures by certain managers, the 
partners continued to collaborate and sought to fix the evaluation sys-
tem and the situations it created and measured. With the renewed cus-
tomer-centric strategy, less sales monitoring at the individual level and 
a more long-term perspective, collaboration between the parties re-
turned to the “dance floor”.  
Conclusion  
Recall the research question with which we guided our research: how 
do evaluation devices function as boundary objects sustaining, justify-
ing and resisting relations inscribed between employers and unions? 
Our case study affords insight into a significant research question con-
cerning the infrapolitics of organization and how, over time, evaluation 
Reactivity and Resistance to Evaluation Devices   53
devices function as boundary objects sustaining, justifying and resist-
ing the relations they inscribe between employers and unions. These 
infrapolitics are irredeemably processual rather than structural: they 
are not inscribed in employment relations per se but the processes 
whereby these are monitored, measured and managed.  
The evaluation device, as a boundary object, did not function as a 
device offering unchanging affordances. Boundary objects have been, 
since the inception of the concept, celebrated for their role in facilitat-
ing collaboration and cooperation. Thinking of the evaluation device 
as a boundary object, it is evident that its effects were variable, with 
the variance being enacted by changing power relations that were 
themselves inscribed in the uses to which they were put. In the wake of 
the global financial crisis of 2007–08, when the whole area of financial 
services was being stigmatized, the evaluation device became an occa-
sion for union/management cooperation to restore consumer confid-
ence. The device, in the abstract, seemed to afford a way of enhancing 
collaboration between financial advisors and the management of the 
bank: it was a tool used to engender cooperation.  
The shock of the global crisis receded and as it did the second order 
effects of the implementation of the device became more apparent. In 
practice, the device became a tool for management with which to dif-
ferentiate the performance of financial advisors in terms of their 
powers as salespersons, judged and justified by the responsibility at-
tributed to them for the sales they made, irrespective of the context 
and customer characteristics of the branches in which the sales were 
made. In consequence, the affordances of the device as a boundary ob-
ject changed from being primarily productive of cooperation and col-
laboration to becoming an object of discord. The use of the device 
provided an occasion on which to project concerns about the extent to 
which the devices’ possibilities were perceived differently and were be-
ing used in vastly different contexts. These contextual factors changed 
with the relative normalization of the industry after the crisis but the 
demographic differences in the customer base persisted.  
In terms of infrapolitics it is evident that while the MOT system was 
introduced responsibly by agreement between both sides of the em-
ployment relation, union and management, as its use developed as a 
device joint responsibility eroded. The device was an instrument and it 
was not that the instrument changed but the uses to which it was put 
were extended without joint responsibility for doing so being sought. 
Once the union was challenged with responsibility for the changed 
uses to which the device was being applied, including personal and 
public rating and ranking, the infrapolitics of collaboration changed. 
Individual resistances followed by collective resistance by the union 
marked the beginning of the end of the device in an instrumentally in-
trusive manner, as we discovered when the field was revisited some 
years later.  
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Over time, initial agreements between labour and employer morph-
ed into discord and resistance. Once the project was implemented the 
device functioned in a system of representations long established and 
routine. These representations were not just about the personal use of 
the feedback as a learning device occasioned by the metrics but also 
the personnel uses to which an overall knowledge of the distribution of 
the data allowed. While the individual organizational member might 
learn from their individual feedback, the organizational management 
learned from the distribution of the metrics across the population of 
financial advisors. The affordances shifted on a number of grounds. 
First, there was the amount of data available to the individual, with 
relative position in the management hierarchy of those using the data 
being the crucial variable. Second, there was the demographic distribu-
tion of familiarity with notions such as the quantified self, largely the 
preserve of the younger financial advisors and some high performing 
senior advisors, according to our interviewees. Third, the device fa-
voured those that were demographically favoured in their client base 
and stigmatized those that were not. Hence, what were the affordances 
of the evaluation device varied with its use, not its design as an in-
strument. The affordances were an effect of hierarchical access to the 
overall data; to more youthful familiarity with the use of personal met-
rics of performance and to some extent were also a function of cus-
tomer demography, as a major determinant of “magic moments”. 
Some of the downsides of the MOT mapping, as we have described 
them, were acknowledged by management such that today there are 
no individual sales targets for financial advisors but there is monitor-
ing of customer satisfaction and customer development. Hence, resist-
ance to the use of the device was tempered and the current device has 
been renamed, simplified and qualified to remove some difficult ques-
tions for customers and elements beyond the control of the personnel 
concerned. Besides, there is more emphasis on the learning potential 
from the qualitative comments and customers’ stories, and new ways 
of mapping customers’ preferences for and use of different channels, 
with a shift away from commensuration and its justifications. 
In conclusion, we may say that, theoretically, the case illustrates 
some valuable lessons when a qualitative phenomenon (customer satis-
faction) is quantified and measured to facilitate comparisons, as de-
scribed in the social studies of literature on quantification and com-
mensuration (Power 1997; Espeland and Sauder 2007). Individuals 
alter their behaviour as a consequence of monitoring and surveillance, 
which changes the relations between service provider and customers, 
between employees and employers and the presentations of self made 
by service providers. In our case, in lay terms the figures were seen as 
reflecting instead of constructing reality, with the evaluation device 
contributing to enhanced sales pressure instead of more customer ori-
entation. In addition, a metric invented for one purpose became used 
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by some managers for both personal auditing and personnel evaluation 
(Armstrong 2002).  
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Appendix: Overview of interact ion  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